

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
SOUTHERN DIVISION

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GREGORY HARDY,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:07-cv-607

v.

Honorable Robert Holmes Bell

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT  
OF CORRECTIONS et al.,

Defendants.

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**OPINION DENYING LEAVE  
TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS - THREE STRIKES**

Plaintiff, a prisoner incarcerated at Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. Because Plaintiff has filed at least three lawsuits which were dismissed as frivolous, he is barred from proceeding *in forma pauperis* under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Court will order Plaintiff to pay the \$350.00 civil action filing fee within thirty days of this opinion and accompanying order, and if Plaintiff fails to do so, the Court will order that his action be dismissed without prejudice. Even if the case is dismissed, Plaintiff will be responsible for payment of the \$350.00 filing fee in accordance with *In re Alea*, 286 F3d 378, 380-81 (6th Cir. 2002).

**Discussion**

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), which was enacted on April 26, 1996, amended the procedural rules governing a prisoner's request for the privilege of proceeding *in forma pauperis*. As the Sixth Circuit has stated, the PLRA

was “aimed at the skyrocketing numbers of claims filed by prisoners—many of which are meritless—and the corresponding burden those filings have placed on the federal courts.” *Hampton v. Hobbs*, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997). For that reason, Congress put into place economic incentives to prompt a prisoner to “stop and think” before filing a complaint. *Id.* For example, a prisoner is liable for the civil action filing fee, and if the prisoner qualifies to proceed *in forma pauperis*, the prisoner may pay the fee through partial payments as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The constitutionality of the fee requirements of the PLRA has been upheld by the Sixth Circuit. *Id.* at 1288.

In addition, another provision reinforces the “stop and think” aspect of the PLRA by preventing a prisoner from proceeding *in forma pauperis* when the prisoner repeatedly files meritless lawsuits. Known as the “three-strikes” rule, the provision states:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under [the section governing proceedings *in forma pauperis*] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The statutory restriction “[i]n no event,” found in § 1915(g), is express and unequivocal. The statute does allow an exception for a prisoner who is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” The Sixth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of the “three-strikes” rule against arguments that it violates equal protection, the right of access to the courts, and due process, and that it constitutes a bill of attainder and is *ex post facto* legislation. *Wilson v. Yaklich*, 148 F.3d 596, 604-06 (6th Cir. 1998); *accord Rodriguez v. Cook*, 169 F.3d 1176, 1178-82 (9th Cir. 1999);

*Rivera v. Allin*, 144 F.3d 719, 723-26 (11th Cir. 1998); *Carson v. Johnson*, 112 F.3d 818, 821-22 (5th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff has been an active litigant in the federal courts in Michigan. In more than three of Plaintiff's lawsuits, the Court entered dismissals on the grounds of failure to state a claim. *See Hardy v. Theut*, No. 2:04-cv-263 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2004); *Hardy v. Mich. Parole Bd.*, No. 2:04-cv-246 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 8, 2004); *Hardy v. Kedzierzawski*, No. 2:04-cv-207 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2004); *Hardy v. Southwestern Michigan Assessment Services*, No. 1:98-cv-786 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 1, 1998).

Plaintiff's allegations that he was assaulted by prison guards do not fall within the exception for an inmate under "imminent danger of serious physical injury." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Congress did not define "imminent danger" in the PLRA, but it is significant that Congress chose to use the word "imminent," a word that conveys the idea of immediacy. "Imminent" is "Near at hand . . . impending; on the point of happening; threatening, menacing, perilous. Something which is threatening to happen at once, something close at hand, something to happen upon the instant . . . and on the point of happening." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 514-15 (6th ed. 1991). "Imminent" is also defined as "ready to take place, near at hand, impending, hanging threateningly over one's head, menacingly near." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1130 (1976). "Imminent danger" is "such an appearance of threatened and impending injury as would put a reasonable and prudent man to his instant defense." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 515 (6th ed. 1991).

This does not however, mean that a district court must accept any and all allegations of injury as sufficient to forestall application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A district court has the discretion to discredit factual claims of imminent danger that are "clearly baseless," i.e., allegations

that are fantastic or delusional and rise to the level of the “irrational or wholly incredible.” *Gibbs v. Cross*, 160 F.3d 962, 967 (3rd Cir. 1998) (quoting *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)); *see also Chance v. Tennessee*, No. 02-5322, 2002 WL 31255478, at \*1 (6th Cir. Oct. 7, 2002) (allegations that the plaintiff was the target of a government-sponsored “contract hit” were insufficient to establish imminent danger).

Moreover, a prisoner’s allegation that he faced imminent danger or was assaulted sometime in the past is insufficient basis to allow him to proceed *in forma pauperis* pursuant to imminent danger exception to the three strikes provision. *Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie*, 239 F.3d 307, 310-11 (3d Cir. 2001); *Medberry v. Butler*, 185 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 1999); *Ashley v. Dilworth*, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998); *Luedke v. Bertand*, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1077 (E.D. Wis. 1999). This is particularly true where, as here, Plaintiff’s allegations pertain to events that occurred at Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility, a facility other than his current place of incarceration. *See Day v. Maynard*, 200 F.3d 665, 667 (10th Cir. 1999).

In light of the foregoing, § 1915(g) prohibits Plaintiff from proceeding *in forma pauperis* in this action. Plaintiff has thirty days from the date of entry of this order to pay the entire civil action filing fee, which is \$350.00. When Plaintiff pays his filing fee, the Court will screen his complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). If Plaintiff fails to pay the filing fee within the thirty-day period, his case will be dismissed without prejudice, but he will continue to be responsible for payment of the \$350.00 filing fee.

Date: July 11, 2007

/s/ Robert Holmes Bell

ROBERT HOLMES BELL

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

**SEND REMITTANCES TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS:**

Clerk, U.S. District Court  
399 Federal Building  
110 Michigan Street, NW  
Grand Rapids, MI 49503

**All checks or other forms of payment shall be payable to “Clerk, U.S. District Court.”**